PREFACE
In the opening months of the Third Millennium, the United States enjoys an economic, military, and political preeminent position globally. Despite a lagging economy, the "war on terrorism," and other factors, the United States finds itself in an enviable position vis a vis the other nations of the world. This position was achieved during the 20th Century as the United States established markets, took advantage of technology, and established or strengthened its infrastructures both at home and abroad. This latter area has become not only a boon but also a burden. A boon because the infrastructures facilitate unprecedented growth. A burden because the infrastructures are increasingly dependent upon one another not only for local operations but also for survival within the global community.
The infrastructures addressed in this paper represent a framework of inter-dependent networks and systems comprising identifiable industries, institutions, functions, and distribution capabilities. They provide a continual flow of goods and services essential to the economic well-being, security, and defense of the United States. On the National and commercial side, the infrastructure is defined by nine areas or sectors. These sectors are Banking and Finance, Transportation, Electric and Gas (Power), Information and Communications Personnel; Logistics; and Space. And while the commercial side doesn't necessarily depend upon the Defense side for its survival, with the exception of Public Works, the same cannot be said for the Department of Defense.
Therein lies the problem for the policy makers not only at the National-level but also within the Department of Defense. For the Department of Defense the issue is one of dependency and reliance upon the commercial sector to deliver goods and services when and where needed. As Defense drew down forces, closed installations, and contracted more of its operations, it created a greater dependency upon the private sector. The private sector itself went through similar changes; the most important of which were the consolidation of operations, increased foreign ownership of once U.S stalwarts, the closing of plants in the Continental United States, and the movement of operations to foreign countries. Thus, the United States and the Department of Defense are also dependent upon the infrastructures of foreign countries. This, of course is a significant issue when developing military campaign plans.
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The reader should gain the sense that, in general, critical infrastructure protection is not insurmountable. In fact, protecting the infrastructure is something we do daily, especially in the Department of Defense for those infrastructures that we own and operate. What the reader should take away is the knowledge that there is considerable thought and debate going into the subject. Additionally, there are those who have provided approaches and solutions that capitalize on existing programs as a means of reducing redundancy and cost. The difficulty, however, is the lack of a clear way ahead not only at the National level but also within the Department of Defense. This becomes more important as we define not only the meaning the meaning of Homeland Security but also the functions, systems and assets associated with that mission.
The author is grateful to Colonel Frank R. Hancock for his excellent insights on improving the content of this paper and Dot Overcash for her editing suggestions. Don Bennett deserves mention for his patience and perseverance while I developed and refined the Army If you browse through the bibliography you will note that I have referenced a number of excellent books, articles, and papers. I am grateful to the authors who have contributed to my learning and I thank them for their scholarship. I must also inform the reader that any and all comments, interpretations, and errors of fact within this paper are entirely my own. The images of the events of September 11, 2001 are burned into the memory of all Americans both at home and abroad. The pictures viewed on the cable news and major television networks and in newspapers worldwide brought home to all the vulnerability of the American homeland. In the aftermath we ask ourselves how this happened and if it will happen again. We question, given the extent of the attack, why we weren't better prepared for it. We also question if we are prepared for the potential of other such attacks. And we wonder if the Executive and Legislative branches of the Federal government are prepared to take the necessary steps to resolve related issues. The President and his Cabinet are attempting to answer these questions. The concerns of the American people will be answered with statements of policy. Some related policy [antiterrorism, force protection, combating terrorism, and critical infrastructure protection] was debated, drafted, and promulgated in the previous administration. It is this policy and its execution that warrants our attention; for it is the underpinning of thought and action related to homeland security.
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LIST OF TABLES
A review of each of the related policies is not within the scope of this paper. However, one policy, critical infrastructure protection, bears mention in that it is a vital national interest and is at the heart of how this country operates and upon which this country survives. Any antiterrorism or force protection actions under the umbrella of territorial security, homeland defense, or homeland security will focus on the infrastructures of the United States as potential centers of gravity.
In The White Paper focused on two aspects of national power: economic and military. It described them as "mutually reinforcing and dependent" 4 and "increasingly reliant upon certain critical infrastructures and upon cyber-based information systems." 5 These infrastructures, mentioned previously, are found in the preamble to Executive Order 13010. For the Commission and for the Nation the issue is the increasing automation and interlinking of these infrastructures as a result of "advances in information technology and the necessity of improved efficiency," 6 thus, rendering them increasingly vulnerable to human error, failure in equipment, acts of nature, and attacks both physical and cyber. The Paper suggested that "future enemies, whether nations, groups or individuals, may seek to harm us in non-traditional ways including attacks within the United States." 7 It states further "our economy is increasingly reliant upon interdependent and cyber-supported infrastructures and non-traditional attacks on our infrastructure and information systems may be capable of significantly harming both our military power and our economy."
8 President Clinton's intent was clear: "take all necessary measures to swiftly eliminate significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems." 9 The President established the following objective:
No later than the year 2000, the United States shall have achieved an initial operating capability and no later than five years from the day the President signed Presidential Decision Directive 63 the United States shall have achieved and shall maintain the ability to protect our nation's critical infrastructure from intentional acts that would significantly diminish the abilities of:
• the Federal Government to perform essential national security missions and to ensure the general public health and safety.
• state and local governments to maintain order and to deliver minimum essential public services.
• the private sector to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy and the delivery of essential telecommunications, energy, financial and transportation services.
10
The concept included a "Public-Private Partnership to Reduce Vulnerability." 11 That is, the public and private sectors, in close coordination, should work to eliminate potential vulnerabilities to facilities in the economy and in the government. The concept, to the extent practicable, should neither include increased government regulation nor "unfunded government mandates to the private sector." 12 Additionally, the concept required the establishment of a National Coordinator, Lead Agencies, and Sector Liaison Officials who shall contribute to a "sectoral National Infrastructure Assurance Plan." 13 Their task was to develop a plan for "assessing the vulnerabilities of the sector to cyber or physical attacks; recommending a plan to eliminate significant vulnerabilities; proposing a system for identifying and preventing attempted major attacks; developing a plan for alerting, containing and rebuffing an attack in progress and then, in coordination with FEMA as appropriate, rapidly reconstituting minimum essential capabilities in the aftermath of an attack." 14 Further, the "National Coordinator, in conjunction with the Lead Agency Sector Liaison Officials and a representative of the National Economic
Council, shall ensure their overall coordination and integration of the various sectoral plans, with a particular focus in interdependencies." 15 Additional detail was provided in terms of guidelines and structure and organization. The objective and the concept were presented in detail.
A National Security Strategy For A Global Age was published in December 2000. 16 It established "the protection of our critical infrastructures" as a vital national interest. The National Security Strategy details, to some extent, the means with which the United States attains its objective to "take all necessary measures to swiftly eliminate significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber the Bush Administration will fine-tune this policy. Considering the current will of the people and the mood in Congress, it appears that the Administration will receive the necessary resources to carry its homeland security and critical infrastructure protection programs. The difficulty facing the current Administration is in determining infrastructure "criticality" in terms of what to protect, when to protect it, and how to protect it. This will be done in the face of competing private sector and Congressional interests. Keeping in mind the admonition that if you protect everything you protect nothing, the Administration will walk a fine line in balancing the concept, objectives, and resources relating to critical infrastructure protection.
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The Constrained resources complicate mitigation of these risks. Nonetheless, as the Army enters the Third Millennium, it must look beyond traditional protection programs to strategies that assure the capability to perform missions required to execute the National Military Strategy.
The United States exists in a complex and potentially dangerous environment that includes terrorist threats and on-going cyber attacks. The free and open nature of our society makes it increasingly vulnerable to terrorist and asymmetric attacks. A growing population increases the vulnerability to the effects of manmade and natural disasters. As a major source of Homeland Security resources, the Army must be prepared to respond to increasing calls for capabilities within this complex, danger-filled environment. supplies, equipment, and software.
CAPABILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS
The Army brings a number of tangible capabilities to bear on the infrastructure assurance mission. These are the Army's existing protection, reporting and resource management programs. These mature programs ensure the overall protection of soldiers and property as well as the management and resourcing of the force. These programs must be synchronized in order to prioritize efforts for ensuring support to the warfighter.
The Army is also faced with three significant constraints to its effort to support the warfighter through infrastructure assurance. The first is the fusion of existing assessments.
Currently, there is no focal point for the fusion of vulnerability and risk management information.
Information from vulnerability assessments (Balanced Survivability Assessments, Joint Staff
Integrated Vulnerability Assessments, Transportation Infrastructure Criticality and Vulnerability
Assessments, and Service-directed vulnerability assessments) and other related reports and inspections are not readily available while others are restricted. Additionally, there are currently no efforts to correlate the results of these and related assessment and "Red Team" reports to determine the overall infrastructure vulnerability of an Army power projection platform or supporting Army installation. Most notable is the lack of an ability to determine overall vulnerability trends and to correlate these with trends both within the Federal government and the private sector.
The second constraint is outsourcing and privatization. Today, the increased number of privatized and outsourced functions complicates the Army's ability to assure the infrastructure required to support the execution of combatant command operations and contingency plans. Defense to coordinate remediation efforts of the national, public, and private infrastructures.
Reconstitution is conducted at all levels and seeks to rebuild or restore an infrastructure after it has been damaged or compromised. The Army Staff and Army Major Commands support incident response by providing resources to rebuild or restore an infrastructure after it has been damaged or compromised.
PLANNING ACTIVITIES (TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL)
At the tactical level, commanders assure Army infrastructure through implementation of Army protection programs. At the operational level, Army Major Command staffs and commanders ensure these protection programs are implemented and sustained with adequate resources to ensure the Army installation has the capability to perform the functions required to support the warfighter.
PLANNING ACTIVITIES (STRATEGIC)
At the strategic level, the goal is to assure the capability of the United States Army to perform the functions required to support the operations and contingency plan(s) of the unified combatant commands. To do this, the Army Staff focuses on three principle activities: strategic analysis, strategic assessment, and strategic mitigation. The convergence of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels is the fusion of the eight infrastructure assurance planning activities. However, the focus is on the fusion of missionbased analysis with existing vulnerability and risk assessments. The capability to fuse and synthesize this information provides an Army-level view of vulnerabilities, trends, and mitigation priorities. Fusion activities assist each level in planning and programming resources and they provide the capability to monitor the expenditure of resources used to mitigate vulnerabilities and manage risk. Additionally, fusion activities offer a consolidated infrastructure vulnerability assessment report to the Army installation commander assisting in his infrastructure vulnerability mitigation management efforts. The next section provides a proposal for the mission, organization, and capabilities required for a fusion activity. methodology and provides it to the Army Major Commands and the Army installations so that they can identify those functions, systems, and assets that, when not assured, result in a negative impact on the Army commander's ability to execute his mission. This methodology also helps the department-level planners and policy makers to identify intra-and interdependencies between and among supporting infrastructures, both public and private.
MISSION ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
Problem
The Army does not currently have a process to identify mission essential functions that are in direct support to the unified combatant commander. Likewise, the Army does not currently have a process through which mission essential functions, systems and assets can be vetted against existing vulnerability assessment processes in order to perform focused risk management.
Facts Bearing on the Problem
There are four significant facts that, the inability to deal with any one of them, cause the Army to fail in its responsibilities under Title 10 -Armed Forces, United States Code. These are as follows:
• Scarce mitigation resources require the development of a focused ability to identify mission essential functions.
• The Unified Combatant Commander's operations plans, the time-phased force deployment lists, and high demand low density assets are all crucial to identifying mission essential functions, systems, and assets in support of the warfighter.
• The correlation of information derived from a mission-based analysis and existing vulnerability assessments and studies is essential in determining the Army's ability to support the warfighter.
• Multiple agencies and organizations perform vulnerability assessments.
MISSION ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
As previously stated, Army Infrastructure Assurance concentrates on assuring functional capability as opposed to concentrating specifically on the protection of individual assets. This concept is never more important than when attempting to determine the "criticality" of systems, functions, or assets as they support the Title 10 -Armed Forces, United States Code, responsibilities of the Army in relation to its support of the warfighter. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) has wrestled for over two years in attempting to determine infrastructure "criticality" in terms of infrastructure "vulnerability" of a given asset. The approach has concentrated on vulnerability assessments relating to assets "owned" by the commanders of the combatant commands.
Unfortunately, it has turned out to be nothing more than these commanders submitting wish lists of vulnerable assets that are "owned" by others. That is, the Services, the Host Nations, and Army capable of supporting the warfighter under all conditions. The methodology described below may not be the only one allowing the Army or another Service, for that matter, to conduct a capability analysis; this one worked to a degree that was not found in other methodologies tried.
Process I, Identify the Army resources provided to the warfighter.
In Process I planners require an understanding of how the warfighter intends to accomplish the described mission. In other words we are looking for his requirements and his intent and we are identifying Army warfighting requirements of the unified combatant commander so that they can be linked to the supporting Army infrastructure. These become the basic input with which our analysis starts. We find these requirements in the Time-phased 
Process II, Link the warfighter's Army resources to Army and Defense infrastructure functions.
In Process II the output from Process I carry over to become input for the Process II analysis. Two additional inputs are added at this stage. The first is the Army Mobilization
Operations and Execution System and the Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment
System. This set of documents gives the analyst a better understanding of how the Army mobilizes itself to support the warfighter. It also contains details pertaining to the functions of the mobilization stations and other mobilization requirements. However, while these sets of documents cover the vast majority of the Army and how it mobilizes, each Army Major
Command has its own documents relating to mobilization and deployment. When required, these documents also become another input to Process II. The second form of input is the Defense Sector infrastructure characterizations. Described earlier in this paper, these characterizations provide a view of how the infrastructure within a Defense Sector is arrayed, its intra-dependencies, and its potential inter-dependencies with the other Defense Sectors. The process involved in this step is to establish relationships between and among all of the available information contained in the input as described. Three outcomes result from this procedure.
First, we find the inter-and intra-dependent systems and assets required to mobilize and move personnel, equipment, and supplies owned and provided for by the Army and the Department of Defense. Second, we find inter-and intra-dependent systems and assets required to mobilize and move personnel, equipment, and supplies owned and provided for by the agencies of the Federal Government and by commercial enterprises. Third, we find the functions required to provide strategic, operational, and tactical command, control, communications, and intelligence support. This output forms the input for Process III. It also completes the Mobilization and Deployment Assessment.
Process III, Array intra-and inter-dependent systems and assets by owner(s).
Process III is the beginning of the Army Assessment, Mitigation and Protection
Processes. During this step sorting is the primary action. Taking the output of Process II, and reintroducing the Defense sector characterizations as a baseline, the analyst sorts the information based upon organization asset ownership and organization mitigation responsibilities. Two outcomes result from this sorting. The first provides feedback to the Defense infrastructure sector lead with a verified list of required functions, systems, and assets.
This list supports revision of the Defense Infrastructure Sector Assurance Plan. The second, provides feedback to various Army, Joint, and National organizations in the form of a verified list of functions, systems, and assets in order to assist in vulnerability assessments, risk management, and mitigation efforts.
Process IV, Identify vulnerable mission essential systems and assets.
Process IV takes all of the previous information (lists of mission essential functions and their associated systems and assets) and some new information (in the form of reports and studies)
for the purpose of identifying vulnerable mission essential assets. These reports are reviewed in a process that we call "Fusion Activities" (these activities are covered in detail later on in this paper). These reports and studies may be: Three things take place during this process. First, a comparison is made of systems and assets associated with mission essential functions against results from the reports, studies, and assessments addressing vulnerabilities. Second, a determination is made of the quality and quantity of the information available on assessed systems and assets. Third, an analysis is made of Army-wide vulnerabilities, trends, and resources to assure Army infrastructure. This results in the following output.
• One, a list of vulnerable mission essential systems and assets that can be sorted by function, geographical location, region, and owner.
• Two, a list of vulnerable mission essential systems and assets that can be sorted by function, geographical location, region, and owner requiring reassessment.
• Three, a list of trends and resources associated with mission essential systems and asset vulnerabilities that can be sorted by function, geographical location, region, and owner.
These outputs can serve as the basis for developing a mitigation strategy or strategies by function, by geographical location, by region, or by owner. Additionally, the results of the analysis can be fed back to the warfighter and the Joint Staff in order to fine-tune the operations plan and or the time-phased force development list.
Example
The Commander-in-Chief Pacific is told that a vulnerability exists at a bridge in the Pacific
Northwest. This bridge, he is told, conveys the only road into an ammunition supply facility.
Additionally, he is told that not only does the bridge convey the road it also conveys all of the fuel and power lines, not to mention the water main, into the facility. He is further told that, if a terrorist were to drop the bridge a war fight would be in jeopardy in a designated region of his area of operation. The Commander-in-Chief is concerned. He cannot believe that this single "critical" infrastructure could affect the outcome of a campaign. He wonders who would draw up a plan that allowed for such a vulnerability. However, his background and experience tell him that what he really needs to do is to attack the problem from two angles. The first is to determine how much a delay there will be in moving ammunition to the theater if the bridge is destroyed. Second, to determine how he can work around the problem. Using the mission analysis methodology he determines that the in-theater commander has significant stock of ammunition in depots in country. Based upon the calculations he has enough ammunition of all kinds to fight the campaign for ninety days without re-supply. Additionally, the engineers tell the Commander-in-Chief Pacific that they can have the bridge back in operation in less than two weeks. However, if the engineers are incorrect in their assessment, he has the ability to coordinate movement of ammunition from other deep port facilities on the West Coast and still meet ammunition requirements in theater. What the mission analysis told the Commander-inChief Pacific was that the bridge, while vulnerable, was not "critical" to the execution of the plan. The concept of operations for the Army Infrastructure Assurance Fusion Activity is designed to express as abstract idea relating to infrastructure assurance risk management.
FUSION ACTIVITY
Specifically, it outlines a proposal to establish, within the Army, a method for analyzing multiple vulnerability assessments and reports as they relate to the combatant commander's operations plan. The result is comprehensive infrastructure assurance risk management plans with associated cost.
The need for an infrastructure assurance fusion activity is demonstrated by the fact that the Army does not have a means of correlating the disparate reports and vulnerability assessments, provided by numerous organizations both inside the Army and the Department of Defense and external to the Department of Defense, in order to determine risk to its ability to support the unified combatant commander. A fusion activity, as described herein, provides that capability. The fusion activity is seen as a value added organization providing another tool for infrastructure assurance risk management activities supporting strategic readiness.
The need for a fusion activity is based upon experience gained over the last two years. It is built on conclusions drawn from various mission-based analysis studies and the inability of the critical infrastructure protection community to determine an acceptable meaning of and standard for "criticality."
The author recognizes the difficulty in establishing new organizations at any time but especially in today's environment. However, the Army cannot afford not to regard an organization of this type, considering the possibilities for a focused and coordinated infrastructure assurance risk management strategy.
The concept and ideas expressed may appear threatening to some stakeholders. This is always true when innovation is proposed. However, there are significant long-term benefits to be gained militating against perceived parochialism. It is the best interests of National Security that stakeholders share ideas about improving the concept, specifically in the areas of policy related to the sharing of various types of vulnerability assessments and reports across the interagency.
PROBLEM
From an infrastructure assurance (critical infrastructure protection) standpoint, the Army does not have a means of correlating mission essential functions supporting operations or contingency plan execution with the disparate reports and vulnerability assessments.
Specifically, the Army does not have an organization chartered to:
• Manage the identification of all strategic, operational, and tactical functions, systems and assets required to support Army execution of a unified combatant command operations or contingency plan.
• Oversee and act as a catalyst for the fusion of Army infrastructure assurance analytical activities with existing assessment and mitigation activities.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
• No central clearing house exists within the Army for the express purpose of correlating infrastructure information in order to provide a comprehensive risk management information to installation commanders and the unified combatant commander.
• There are numerous reports, studies, and assessments concerning infrastructure vulnerabilities developed by Defense and public and private organizations. These reports can be installation or asset specific.
CONCEPT
Risk Management
The essence of any decision-making is making trade-offs among very difficult and complex objectives that are often in conflict and competition with one another. Good qualitative risk assessment and management must be grounded on basic systems engineering philosophy and principles. Good risk studies must be judged against valid criteria. The Center for Risk Management of Engineering Systems, University of Virginia suggests 10 criteria for risk studies.
The study must be… Army infrastructure assurance risk management is a process that must answer the following set of questions.
• What can go wrong?
• What is the likelihood something will go wrong?
• What are the consequences if something goes wrong?
• What can be done to mitigate the consequences?
• What options are available and what are the associated trade-offs?
• What is the impact on future options of current decisions?
FUSION ACTIVITY MISSION
The fusion activity provides functional risk assessments in support of the operations planning of the Army component of the unified combatant commander through the identification of vulnerable mission essential functions, systems, and assets. Specifically, the activity shall:
• Identify strategic, operational, and tactical functions, systems and assets required to support Army execution of each approved unified combatant command operations plan or concept plan;
• Analyze the dependencies of these functions upon functions performed by the Department of Defense, Federal, state, local, or private infrastructures; and
• Match the dependent functions, systems, and assets against existing vulnerability assessments.
FUSION ACTIVITY REQUIREMENTS
The function of the fusion activity is to identify mission essential systems and assets. The identification is accomplished by performing three macro-level tasks. These tasks are:
• Compare the systems and assets associated with mission essential functions against results from, reports, studies, and assessments addressing vulnerabilities.
• Determine the quality and the quantity of the information available on assessed systems and assets.
• Analyze Army-wide vulnerabilities, tends, and resources to assure Army infrastructure. Inherent in the macro-level tasks are two distinct sets of tasks focusing on analytical operations and business operations. The analytical operations are those tasks associated with correlating the various assessments with the output from the mission-based analysis process in order to develop risk-based management strategies and options. The business operations tasks are these tasks required to support the operation of the fusion activity.
As a minimum, the fusion activity must be able to perform the analytical operations tasks listed below. Other analytical tasks may develop over time as experience is gained. These tasks are not listed in order of importance.
• Develop an analytical methodology for correlating the various assessments with output from the mission-related analysis process for infrastructure-related risk-based analysis.
• Develop infrastructure-relate risk-based management strategies and options.
• Develop a research methodology for determining reports and materials necessary for conducting infrastructure-related risk-based analysis.
• Develop costing models and tools for infrastructure-related risk-based management.
• Develop measurements for infrastructure-related risk-based analysis and management.
• Review infrastructure-related engineering reports and assessments.
• Review infrastructure-related transportation reports and assessments.
• Review infrastructure-related telecommunications and information management reports and assessments.
• Review infrastructure-related intelligence reports and assessment.
• Review infrastructure-related logistics reports and assessments.
• Review infrastructure assurance findings contained in Department of Defense and Army Inspector General reports.
• Review infrastructure-related findings contained in Joint Integrated Vulnerability Assessments.
• Review infrastructure-related findings contained in Balanced Survivability Assessments.
• Review infrastructure-related findings private sector infrastructure vulnerability assessments.
• Review infrastructure-related findings contained in General Accounting Office, Office of Management and Budget reports, and Congressional committee reports and investigations.
• Ascertain infrastructure-related trends and conduct trend analysis.
• Conduct infrastructure-related risk-based management conferences, symposia, and workshops.
• Write and coordinate infrastructure-related risk-based management reports.
• Recommend infrastructure-related risk-based policy.
As a minimum, the fusion activity must be able to perform the business operations listed below. Other business operations tasks may develop over time as experience is gained. These tasks are not listed in order of importance.
• Receive, catalogue, and maintain all fusion activity-related documents.
• Review and edit final reports to conform to acceptable practices.
• Develop and maintain databases necessary for the operation of the fusion activity.
• Develop, defend, and manage the fusion activity budget.
• Establish and maintain a local area computer network within the fusion activity.
• Establish and maintain SIPERNET and NIPRNET connectivity for the fusion activity.
• Administer the internal information system of the fusion activity.
• Develop and maintain standing operating procedures for obtaining, cataloguing, and maintaining fusion activity-related documents.
• Develop and maintain standing operating procedures for writing and editing reports.
• Develop and maintain standing operating procedures within the fusion activity for physical security, operations security, information security, and personal security.
• Develop and maintain security classification guidance for the reports generated by the fusion activity.
• Establish and maintain standing operations for the receipt of and accounting for classified documents.
• Establish and maintain automation accounts.
• Develop and maintain standing operating procedures for the purchase, set up, operation, and maintenance of the hardware, software, and firmware required for day-to-day operations of the fusion activity.
• Develop and maintain standing operating procedures for information management within the fusion activity. Manning. Proposed manning for the fusion activity has two distinct teams and is depicted in Figure 1 . All billets require, as a minimum, top secret (SCI SI/TK) clearances. Some individuals may be "read on" to special access programs. Other clearance requirements may be imposed as the activity matures.
Organizational Affiliation. Because of the nature of the work, the audience of the product, and the impact on the Army, the fusion activity falls under the purview of the Under Secretary of the Army. The organization may be located within the National Capital Region but preferably not in the Pentagon. The activity may be located at an institute of higher learning, such as the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, or co-located with the Center for Army Analysis at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Other locations deemed conducive to the research, inquiry, analysis, information sharing, and report writing and the distribution may also be considered.
Fusion Activity Findings. The fusion activity produces detailed infrastructure risk-based reports. These reports form the basis for infrastructure assurance risk management at the installation-level. At a minimum, the reports contain mitigation options and associated costs as a means of assisting the Army installation commander in his risk management activities. Other reports focus on risk-based Defense-wide or Army-wide trends for use by the Army leadership.
All reports are informational and suggestive in nature. Reports do not direct action to be taken.
That is, the Army installation commander uses the report as a tool as he formulates his riskbased management strategy. The distribution of the reports has yet to be determined. 
FUSION ACTIVITY CONCLUSIONS
The need for an infrastructure assurance fusion activity is demonstrated by the fact that the Army does not have a means of correlating the disparate reports and vulnerability assessments, provided by numerous organizations, in order to determine risk to its ability to support the unified combatant commander. A fusion activity, as described above, provides that capability. The fusion activity is a valued added organization providing a tool for risk-based management and readiness activities.
The concept of a fusion activity, while discussed in this paper in terms of Army needs, transcends the Army and the other Services. In order to have value added risk assessment support for the warfighter and in order to maintain consistent Department of Defense policy, the fusion activity is more appropriately a Department of Defense asset. It should be Defensecentric and not Service-centric. Considering the plethora of reports and assessments from within and outside of the Department of Defense, the sensitivities concerning report and assessment contents, and the requirement for unbiased review and analysis, the fusion activity is more appropriately an organization under the cognizance of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). Since the fusion activity is not an operational organization, it can be organized and maintained as part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The details of how this is accomplished and the reporting requirements require negotiation.
CONCLUSION
The contents of this paper cover critical infrastructure protection, Army infrastructure assurance, mission-based analysis, and a proposal for a fusion activity. The reader should have gained a sense that, in general, critical infrastructure protection is not insurmountable. In fact, protecting the infrastructure is something we do daily, especially in the Department of Defense for those infrastructures that we own and operate. And the reader should take away the knowledge that there is considerable thought and debate going into the subject.
Additionally, the reader should understand that approaches and solutions have been provided that capitalize on existing programs as a means of reducing redundancy and cost. Finally, the reader should be aware of the lack of a clear way ahead not only at the National level but also within the Department of Defense. This lack of clear and consistent policy becomes more important as we define the meaning of and the mechanisms for supporting Homeland Security.
Another point the reader should remember is the concept of the fusion activity. ; developed an written by the author. The term "Mission Analysis" is an improvement upon the original term in that "OPLAN-based analysis" connotes that the methodology only applies to the approved operations plan(s) of the unified combatant commander. In retrospect, it is felt that "mission analysis" is less constricting and allows for its application against contingency plans and other types of plans for which infrastructure and the dependence thereon is important.
25 Working paper, unpublished Concept of Operations (CONOPS), "Army Infrastructure Assurance Fusion Activity Concept of Operations (CONOPS)," DRAFT Version 1.6, May 9, 2001 ; developed and written by the author. The term "Mission Analysis" is an improvement upon the original term in that "OPLAN-based analysis" connotes that the methodology only applies to the approved operations plan(s) of the unified combatant commander. In retrospect, it is felt that "mission analysis" is less constricting and allows for its application against contingency plans and other types of plans for which infrastructure and the dependence thereon is important.
GLOSSARY
[the terms provided in this glossary are taken from section ii terms of draft Army Regulation 525-xx, Army Infrastructure Assurance. They are provided here because they constitute a body of information that is required to understand the subject covered in this paper.] Assessment (Infrastructure) An appraisal of the military's reliance on infrastructure, the impacts of that reliance on missions, functions, and tasks, and the identification of options to mitigate vulnerabilities.
Asset (Infrastructure) Any infrastructure facility, equipment, or resource that performs a mission essential function.
Assurance (Infrastructure) Identifying potential actions that can be taken to restore the functions if they are lost, damaged, corrupted, or compromised; and identifying and recommending options to mitigate, protect, and improve these functions.
Command, Control, and Communications Infrastructure Sector This defense infrastructure sector is composed of a number of assets, facilities, networks, systems, and business processes that support the command, control, and communications functions necessary for defense operations. DISA [Defense Information Systems Agency: emphasis added.] is responsible for coordinating the assurance of activities of this defense infrastructure sector.
Critical Infrastructure A term used by the office of the secretary of defense to describe infrastructure so vital that its degradation or loss would have debilitating impacts on defense or economic security.
Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) Defense Infrastructure Sector The DII is the web of communications networks, computers, software, databases, applications, weapons system interfaces, data, security services, and other services that meet the information processing and transport needs of the DOD [Department of Defense: emphasis added.] users across the range of military operations. It encompasses: (1) sustaining bases, tactical, DOD-wide information systems, and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) interfaces to weapons systems; (2) the physical facilities used to collect, distribute, store, process, and display voice, data, and imagery; (3) the applications and data engineering tools, methods, and processes to build and maintain the software that allow command and control (C2), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and mission support users to access and manipulate, organize, and digest proliferating quantities of information; (4) the standards and protocols that facilitate interconnection and interoperation among networks; and (5) the people and assets that provide the integrating design, management and operation of the dii, develop the applications and services, construct the facilities, and train others in dii capabilities and use, (DII Master Plan Version 7.0, page 2.1). Disa [Defense Information Systems Agency: emphasis added] is responsible for coordinating the assurance activities of this defense infrastructure sector.
Financial Services Defense Infrastructure Sector Financial institution services fall into two categories. The first category consists of servicing official DOD [department of defense: emphasis added.] (i.e. Appropriated fund) disbursing and paying operations and providing cash and accepting deposits for credit to officially designated treasury general accounts. The second includes servicing individuals and on-base organizations (i.e. Non-appropriated funds) with normal deposit, maintenance of accounts, safekeeping, and other financial services functions. The defense finance and accounting service (DFAS) supports official DOD activities and provides military and civilian pay, travel pay, transportation pay, vendor pay, contractor pay, dispersing, payment of foreign military sales, and general defense business operations fund accounting. DFAS is responsible for coordinating the assurance activities of this defense infrastructure sector.
Health Affairs Defense Infrastructure Sector DOD [Department of Defense: emphasis added.] maintains extensive health care infrastructure across it facilities world-wide (sic). In addition, DOD manages a larger system of non-DOD care facilities within its health care network. The health care infrastructure consists of facilities and sites located at DOD installations, information systems linking those facilities, and networks of health care among the services and components. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs is responsible for coordinating the assurance activities of this defense infrastructure sector.
Infrastructure
The framework of inter-dependent networks and systems comprising identifiable industries, institutions, functions, and distribution capabilities that provide a continual flow of goods and services essential to the defense and economic security of the United States. Installation An aggregation of contiguous or near contiguous, common mission-supporting real property holdings under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense controlled by and at which an army unit or activity is permanently assigned or temporarily stationed.
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Defense Infrastructure Sector This defense infrastructure sector is composed of those assets, facilities, networks, and systems that support the development, production, and conduct of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance: emphasis added.] Activities, such as intelligence production and fusion centers. DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency: emphasis added.] is responsible for coordinating the assurance activities of this infrastructure sector.
Logistics Defense Infrastructure
The logistics defense infrastructure sector includes all activities, facilities, networks, and systems that support the provision of supplies and service to us forces worldwide. The logistics defense infrastructure includes material acquisition and development; the storage, movement (strategic movement is the responsibility of the transportation infrastructure defense sector and USTRANSCOM [US Transportation Command: emphasis added.]), and distribution of supplies; maintenance of material and supplies; and the final disposition of material no longer needed by DOD [Department of Defense: emphasis added..] The Defense Logistics Agency is responsible for managing most consumable supplies, administering contracts, and acquiring materials and services, and coordinating the assurance activities of this defense infrastructure sector. Mitigation Long-term activities conducted prior to an event to minimize or alleviate the potential adverse effects of a hazardous situation on people, facilities, operations, or services.
Personnel Defense Infrastructure Sector The personnel defense infrastructure sector includes a large number of assets hosted on component [Department of Defense components include the Military Departments and the Defense Agencies: emphasis added.] sites; a network of facilities within and among service components; and computational and information systems linking those sites and facilities. The personnel infrastructure is not only responsible for its own assets, but also coordinates commercial services and facilities that support the personnel function including, but not limited to, recruitment, record keeping, and general training requirements. The Defense Human Resources Agency is responsible for coordinating the assurance activities of this defense infrastructure sector.
Public Works Defense Infrastructure Sector Public works includes five distinct physical infrastructure sectors: land and facilities, electric power, oil and natural gas, water and sewer, and emergency services (fire, medical, hazardous material handling, etc.). This defense infrastructure sector is composed of networks and systems, principally for the distribution of the associated commodities and the real property it supports. The generation, production, and transport of these commodities for and to DOD [Department of Defense: emphasis added.]. Real property assets are primarily the function of their respective national infrastructures. The US Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for coordinating the assurance activities of this defense infrastructure sector.
Reconstitution
Actions taken to re-establish an organization or capabilities of an organization that have been destroyed or severely damaged.
Remediation
Post event actions taken to facilitate immediate response, to minimize or alleviate the negative impact of a hazardous situation on people, facilities, operations, or services, and to quickly restore services.
Response
Activities to address the immediate and short-term effects of an emergency or disaster. Risk A concept used to give meaning to things, forces, or circumstances that pose a danger t people or to things that they value. Normally stated in terms of the likelihood of harm or loss from hazard.
Sector
One of two divisions of the economy (private or public); an identified group (of industries or infrastructures) which performs a similar function within a society, e.g., vital human services. [command, control, and communications: emphasis added.] , space, ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance: emphasis added], financial services, logistics, public works (includes DOD-owned or -operated utilities, roads, rails and railheads and their interface to commercial and other government systems), personnel, and health affairs.
Space Defense Infrastructure The space defense infrastructure sector is composed of both space-and ground-based assets including launch, specialized logistics, and control systems. Facilities are located worldwide on both DOD-controlled and private sites. US Space Command is responsible for coordinating the assurance activities of this defense infrastructure sector.
Transportation Defense Infrastructure Sector The transportation defense infrastructure sector includes resources (surface, sea and lift assets; supporting infrastructure; personnel; and related systems) and interrelationships of DOD, federal, commercial, state/local agencies, and non-US activities that support DOD global transportation needs. US Transportation Command is the single manager for DOD transportation, and responsible for coordinating the assurance activities of this defense infrastructure sector.
Unified Combatant Command A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more military departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Vulnerability
The characteristics of a system which cause it to suffer a definite degradation (incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of effects in a hostile environment.
